Nokia Sues Apple for Patent Infringement Related to iPhone

On October 22, Nokia filed a suit against Apple in Delaware federal court, alleging that the iPhone infringes patents held by Nokia. The New York Times reports that the specific patents deal with the GSM and UMTS wireless standards utilized by the iPhone for voice and data communication, both of which were developed in part by Nokia. The Wall Street Journal notes that the suit might be a strategic response to the iPhone’s increasing momentum in Europe and Asia. Nokia could gain a two-percent royalty on each iPhone sold if the suit succeeds.

Tennessee Couple Is Entitled to Unmask Anonymous Blogger

On October 8, a Tennessee state court held in Swartz v. Does that a couple is entitled to know the identity of the individual who posted critical statements about them in an online blog. Ars Technica notes that the blogger’s claim to protection under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act likely failed because the blog induced readers to spy on the Swartzes and report back on the blog. The Citizen Media Law Project points out that the legal standard used by the judge in this case was “highly protective of anonymous online speech,” but that the Swartzes provided “sufficient evidence in support of their claims of wrongdoing to outweigh the anonymous blogger’s right to anonymity.”

By Kassity Liu – Edited by Stephanie Weiner

Clark v. State, No. 43C01-0705-FA-127 (Ind. Oct. 15, 2009).
Opinion

On October 15, the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed a murder conviction and sentence, rejecting the defendant’s claims on appeal, including an argument that the trial court improperly admitted as character evidence an entry he made online on his MySpace page.  The defendant claimed the admission was in violation of the Indiana Rules of Evidence.

Internet Cases and the WSJ Law Blog provide an overview of the case. Evidence Prof Blog criticizes the court’s reasoning on the MySpace entry issue, noting that the evidence was likely admitted in violation of Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(a), not considered by the court.

The trial jury found Ian J. Clark guilty of murdering his then fiancée’s two-year-old daughter.    Matara Muchowicz left her two-year-old daughter with Clark on May 25, 2007; she returned home from work to find her daughter severely beaten and not breathing. Clark was taken into custody, proclaiming to a detective that he would “beat this” because it was “only a C felony.” The jury recommended a life sentence without the possibility of parole.

On appeal, Clark argued that the trial court had erred by admitting into evidence a posting he had made on his MySpace page. Clark claimed that the posting was improper under Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides that evidence from other “crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”  The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted.  The court found that Rule 404(b) was not implicated because the evidence was of Clark’s own statements rather than his prior actions. Furthermore, the court found that the State had used the posting to rebut Clark’s defense that he was acting recklessly, not intentionally, the day he had killed the two-year-old girl. Clark, by making his character a central issue at trial, had invited the State to use his own words to disprove his defense.  The Court further found the MySpace entry to be probative evidence of Clark’s character and state of mind, particularly when considered in conjunction with Clark’s statements to his arresting officers.

The court also rejected as unfounded Clark’s claim that the prosecution had committed misconduct in questioning him about his involvement with a gang, as well as his claim that fundamental errors during the trial court proceedings required reversal.  The court determined that none of the alleged errors constituted a fundamental error, or “an error that makes a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.”

Clark is one of several recent cases to consider the admissibility of MySpace entries in criminal trials,  with courts reaching differing outcomes based on various grounds.  The issue seems likely to continue to arise in the future – the National Law Journal notes that law enforcement authorities have increasingly sought to introduce such evidence in recent years, and that courts have tended to admit it.

Back to Drawing Board for Pa. State Legislature in Protecting Trademark Holders
By Brittany Blueitt – Edited by Stephanie Weiner

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Omar, No. J-162A-B-2008 (Pa. Oct. 5, 2009)
Majority Opinion (Baer, J.)
Concurring Opinion (Castille, J.)
Dissenting Opinion (Eakin, J.)
Dissenting Opinion (Greenspan, J.)

On October 5, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed two consolidated Centre County Court of Common Pleas decisions dismissing criminal trademark counterfeiting charges on the ground that Pennsylvania’s Trademark Counterfeiting Statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4119, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  The court held that the statute is unconstitutional because it criminalizes a substantial amount of speech protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Commonwealth v. Omar, No. J-162A-B-2008, slip op. at 10 (Pa. Oct. 5, 2009).

IP Spotlight provides an overview of the case. CNBC features an extended analysis of the decision.  The Madisonian declares the decision overly formalistic.

The Centre County Court of Common Pleas had previously held the statute unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Garrity, No.1999-2264 (Pa. March 27, 2000), on the ground it punishes a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech. The Trademark Counterfeiting Statute criminalizes conduct by a person who “knowingly manufactures, uses, displays, advertises, distributes, offers for sale, sells or possesses with intent to sell or distribute any items or services bearing or identified by a counterfeit mark.”  The statute defines “counterfeit mark” broadly to include any “unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual property,” and defines “intellectual property” as “any trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word adopted or used by a person to identify that person’s goods or services.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4119.

In both Commonwealth v. Omar and Commonwealth v. O’Connor, the trial court dismissed charges brought against the defendants under the Trademark Counterfeiting Statute for possession of counterfeit Nike sneakers and distribution of hats bearing the Penn State logo, respectively, based on the Garrity decision.  The Commonwealth appealed both dismissals, which were consolidated for decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Justice Baer, writing for the Supreme Court, reasoned that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad where it punishes a substantial amount of lawful, constitutionally protected activity as well as illegal activity. The court refused to narrow the statute, finding that its words are “clear and free from all ambiguity and thus “the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”  Taking particular issue with the prohibition of any “use” of such a mark, the court concluded that the statute unconstitutionally prohibits protected speech, such as the use of the words “Nike” or “Penn State” on a protest sign, or even their use in the court’s own opinion.

Justices Eakin and Greenspan wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Greenspan argued that the court “has an obligation to interpret a statute in a constitutional manner wherever possible.” Finding the statute to be ambiguous, the dissent urged that the court must consider not only the plain language of the statute, but also the legislative intent underlying it. The intent of the Statute is to “prevent individuals from deceptively utilizing a recognized mark in the context of a sale or distribution” and not to criminalize “the mere use of a recognized word or phrase.” Finally, Justice Greenspan noted that both Omar and O’Connor had illegally violated Nike and Penn State’s trademarks and to overturn their convictions based on the overbreadth of the Statute “has an aura of injustice.”

Chief Justice Castille concurred in the opinion, noting that the primary divide between the majority and dissenting opinions was that both Omar and O’Connor were engaged in the precise illegal activity that the Statute was designed to prohibit. The Chief Justice noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court has directed that, in the First Amendment arena, individuals may assert a facial attack against a statute without demonstrating that his or her own conduct was protected.

By Anthony Kammer – Edited by Evelyn Breithaupt
Solers, Inc. v. Doe, No. 07-CV-159 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2009)
Opinion

On August 13, 2009, the D.C. Court of Appeals remanded Solers, Inc.’s case against an anonymous speaker and provided the lower court with a new standard for determining when an anonymous speaker’s identity may be revealed.

The Volokh Conspiracy notes that although the court limits its decision to defamation claims, the court’s logic would apply to many other forms of anonymous speech. The Citizen Media Law Project points out that this case is factually distinct from many online defamation suits because the comments at issue were not posted on a blog or other public platform. Newsroomlawblog covers the recent decision and has earlier reported that there is a growing trend for courts to protect anonymous speakers unless the plaintiff meets some elevated standard. Ars Technica and Exclusive Rights provide additional commentary.

The D.C. appellate court adopted the following test:

When presented with a motion to quash (or to enforce) a subpoena which seeks the identity of an anonymous defendant, the court should:

(1) ensure that the plaintiff has adequately pleaded the elements of the defamation claim,

(2) require reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous defendant that the complaint has been filed and the subpoena has been served,

(3) delay further action for a reasonable time to allow the defendant an opportunity to file a motion to quash,

(4) require the plaintiff to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on each element of the claim that is within its control, and

(5) determine that the information sought is important to enable the plaintiff to proceed with his lawsuit.

The court stated that it “[did] not require a separate balancing test at the end of the analysis,” nor “a showing that the plaintiff has exhausted alternative sources for learning the information.”

The anti-piracy division of the Software & Information Industry Association (“SIIA”) received an anonymous online tip in March 2005 that Solers, Inc., a defense industry software company, was using pirated software and conducting activities in violation of copyright. The SIIA then ordered that Solers conduct an internal audit to investigate the allegation or face litigation for copyright infringement. Solers conducted the audit and sent a report stating that they found no infringements, and the SIIA closed its file on Solers.

Solers subsequently filed a complaint against the anonymous tipster, alleging defamation and tortious interference with business opportunities. Solers requested the name of the source from SIIA, who refused based on a “long standing policy of keeping the identity of [its] sources anonymous.” Solers then issued a subpoena to the SIIA to turn over the name, and the SIIA refused and moved to quash the subpoena. A D.C. superior court ruled that the SIIA did not have to turn over the name, noting that because the case would not survive a motion to dismiss, the rights of the anonymous tipster outweighed Solers’ interest in his identity.

In reviewing this ruling, the Court of Appeals stated that anonymous online speech was entitled to First Amendment protection but that defamatory speech was not. The Court then conducted a thorough review of discovery standards in defamation suits seeking the identity of anonymous speakers. Some states, such as Virginia, require only a good faith basis for a plaintiff’s claims for the court to compel a third party to turn over the name of an anonymous speaker. New Jersey courts have held that before the identity is revealed the plaintiff must support each of its claims with evidence. The D.C. court here declined to impose a test balancing the First Amendment rights against the plaintiff’s allegations and instead opted for the heightened standard quoted above, requiring some merit to the allegations and a determination that the anonymous speaker’s identity is important for the case to proceed.

]]> http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/first-amendment/solers-inc-v-doe/feed 0 http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/internet/too-much-media-llc-v-hale http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/internet/too-much-media-llc-v-hale#comments Mon, 13 Jul 2009 15:17:20 +0000 DeeAccount http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/?p=161 Blogger Status Fails to Provide Journalistic Protection under N.J. Shield Law

By Ian B. Brooks – Edited by Amanda Rice
Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, Case No. MON-L-2736-08, (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 30, 2009) Slip Opinion

The Monmouth County Superior Court of New Jersey held that the Defendant, blogger Shellee Hale, was not entitled to the protections of a newsperson under New Jersey’s Shield Law. Although Hale claimed that her posts on an Internet message board were intended to inform the public and spur debate on Too Much Media’s alleged activities, Judge Locascio focused on Hale’s credibility and whether her posting resembled traditional news media. The court noted that although the Shield Law in New Jersey was “one of the nation’s broadest,” Hale “presented no credible evidence . . . that she ever worked for any ‘newspapers, magazines, press associations, news agencies or wire services, radio or television.’” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Locascio gave no weight to Hale’s being a blogger or her claims of having published articles in a newspaper and trade journal because she failed to name the publications and lied in her certification to the court, which Judge Locasio labeled a “sham affidavit.”

The Citizen Media Law Project provides an overview of the case. The New Jersey Law Journal also summarizes the case and includes comments from Too Much Media attorney, Joel Kreizman.

The Defendant, Hale, who operated websites offering her life coaching services and maintained a blog, had no background in journalism or connection with any journalist organization. She claimed that she had been investigating criminal activity in the online adult entertainment industry and started a website in 2007 to publish the results of her investigation.  She never posted anything on her site, but communicated her views on porn industry message boards. The plaintiffs, Too Much Media, LLC, manufacture NATS, software used by websites to manage pay-per-click advertising commissions. After news reports that hackers had broken into the NATS database and obtained information about subscribers to various adult websites, Hale posted allegedly defamatory statements on the website Oprano (the self-proclaimed “Wall Street Journal of Porn”) about Too Much Media and its principals.

Despite Hale’s claims that her posting was intended to inform the public of Too Much Media’s improper business actions, the court ruled that her postings were not similar enough to a traditional news media outlet to allow protection under the Shield Law. The Shield Law protects newspersons from having to disclose their sources in legal proceedings. The court stated that message board postings require no fact-checking or poster credentials. The court noted that extending the protections provided to newspersons to bloggers like Hale “would mean anyone with an email address, with no connection to any legitimate news publication, could post anything on the internet and hide behind the Shield Law’s protections.”

This case represents the first time in New Jersey that a blogger has attempted to shield herself under the Shield Law to avoid revealing her sources after making allegedly defamatory comments on an Internet message board. While it seems unlikely that this holding will deny protection to all bloggers, the Daily Record suggests that bloggers who do not have significant ties to news organizations will not be protected by the New Jersey Shield Law. On the other hand, Jonathan Hart stated to the New Jersey Law Journal that the holding of this case is limited to its specific facts and will not extend to other bloggers.

By Debbie Rosenbaum – Edited By Amanda Rice
Julie Doe II et al. v. MySpace Inc., Case No. B205643, (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2009)
Opinion

On June 30, the Second District Court of Appeals in Los Angeles affirmed the judgment of the lower court and held that online social networks and other websites cannot be held liable for a sexual assault on a minor that stems from an online meeting. The court rejected claims made by the parents of four girls who were between thirteen and fifteen years old when they created MySpace profiles. The court followed Fifth Circuit precedent, Doe I v. Myspace, which JOLT Digest’s Anna Volftsun previously summarized in May 2008.

The Court of Appeals held that girls who are sexually assaulted by men they first contact on MySpace cannot seek damages from the social-networking website, which is protected from liability by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. “[T]hey want MySpace to ensure that sexual predators do not gain access to (i.e., communicate with) minors on its Web site. That type of activity-to restrict or make available certain material-is expressly covered by section 230,” wrote the court.

Ars Technica provides an overview of the case. CNET and Reuters also summarize the main points of the case. Eric Goldman offers a nice in-depth analysis of the case and emphasizes the defense’s use of Roomates.com precedent.

The plaintiffs, four underage girls (referred to as Julie Does) and their parents, sued MySpace for gross negligence and strict product liability after they were sexually assaulted by older men whom they met through the website. The plaintiffs alleged that MySpace had failed to employ adequate age verification measures or keep profiles on a “private” setting.

Despite the unfortunate circumstances in which these events took place, the court found that MySpace was protected from liability by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Section 230 is the same law that has protected Craigslist from being held responsible for discriminatory housing ads and other websites from being held liable for defamatory content created by third parties. The court’s opinion distinguishes the Roommates.com case (hosted by EFF) (which held that requiring users to answer questions that encouraged violation of the Fair Housing Act was not protected by Section 230) by noting that the questions that MySpace asks its users are neither required nor themselves illegal.

This decision was welcomed by free speech advocates, and is particularly salient in light of the Lori Drew reversal, covered by Flash Digest here, which limited a plaintiff’s right to seek relief for real life harm caused from online actions.

By Debbie Rosenbaum – Edited by Caitlyn Ross 
Larson v. Correct Craft, June 5, 2009 No. 2008-1208
Opinion hosted by The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

On June 5, the Federal Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court in Larson v. Correct Craft and remanded with instructions to transfer the case back to state court based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).  The court held that because plaintiff Larson assigned his rights to the invention at issue, he did not have standing to sue to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256.  The appeal came from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Correct Craft, Inc., William Snook, and Robert Todd.

IP Watchdog provides an overview of the Federal Court’s decision and PATracer gives an overview of the district court’s ruling.

Borden Larson worked at defendant Correct Craft (”CCI”) for many years, during which time he designed a new wakeboard tower for sports boats.  CCI liked the design, commercialized it, and obtained several patents on it.  CCI later had dealings with two other inventors, defendants Snook, who was also an employee of CCI, and Todd, an independent contractor. Todd apparently filed some patents on the side; eventually, disputes ensued and were ultimately settled with everyone named as inventors on all patents. Plaintiff Larson assigned his rights to CCI, then later filed suit to challenge rights of inventorship and assignments. At issue were several patents CCI had received for the wakeboard tower.

Larson sued his former employer for fraud, breach of contract, and other state law causes of action, and sought a declaratory judgment against his CCI and the co-inventors to establish Larson as the true and sole inventor of the patented wakeboard towers.  The suit was originally filed in Florida state court, but the defendants removed the case to federal court on the theory that the declaratory judgment claims were claims to correct inventorship under § 256 and therefore subject to federal jurisdiction. 

On appeal the Federal Circuit explained that there were two issues regarding whether there was a valid basis for federal jurisdiction. First, Larson’s claims for declaratory relief did not actually invoke § 256.  Second, a question existed with respect to whether Larson had standing to pursue a claim for correction of inventorship in federal court because he had lost his ownership rights and any financial interest he had in the wakeboard-tower patents when he executed the assignment in favor of Correct Craft.

The court held that to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the declaratory judgment claims had to invoke § 256 and the inventor had to have standing. Under this holding, an inventor lacks constitutional standing to sue for correction of inventorship in federal court under § 256 when he has assigned the patent and has no “concrete financial interest” in the patent. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, which had found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and rejected the accused infringer’s ensnarement defense. The Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and sanctions.

By Jad Mills – Edited by Ezra Pinsky
Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Marketing Group Inc., May 19, 2009, No. 82S04-0806-CV-00309.
Slip Opinion

On May 19, 2009, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Vanderburgh Superior Court and Indiana Court of Appeals decisions ordering Piece of America (POA) to pay Gray Loon Outdoor Marketing hosting fees and website redesign charges and denying POA’s conversion claim for the loss of its original website. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Shepard held that POA contracted for the redesign, and although Gray Loon’s project design proposal specifically and unambiguously represented that POA “owned the work product,” this did not vest ownership in POA. The proposal gave POA only a non-exclusive license because it was not properly signed and carried insufficient weight and certainty to transfer the copyright.

Ex©lusive Rights and Eric Goldman each provide an overview of the case. Juliet Moringiello summarizes the case, but also criticizes the court for restricting the analysis to copyright law simply because the asset in question is intangible, when they should focus instead on whether the asset “can be exclusively controlled.”
After completing POA’s website according to its own design proposal, Gray Loon prepared a second phase of the website in accordance with a subsequent request from POA. When POA later refused to pay the bill for the second phase, Gray Loon posted the second phase website without retaining a copy of the original website. After several more months of non-payment, Gray Loon removed the website completely. Gray Loon then sued POA for non-payment and POA countersued for conversion of the original website.

The court agreed with Gray Loon on both issues. Chief Justice Shepard first concluded that the common law of contract applied to these transactions because the “predominant thrust” of the transaction involved the performance of services, not the transfer of goods. He justified this conclusion because “the arrangement between POA and Gray Loon contemplated a custom design for a single customer and an ongoing hosting relationship.” He rejected POA’s assertion that price was essential to the agreement, and held that Gray Loon had a binding contract with POA for the second-phase website “even though Gray Loon had not provided a cost estimate.” Therefore, POA was liable for non-payment of Gray Loon’s fee.

The court also denied POA’s conversion countersuit despite Gray Loon’s specific and unambiguous representation that POA “owned the work product.” The court restricted its analysis of POA’s conversion claims to property rights receivable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Because Gray Loon was an independent contractor and had not “expressly agree[d] in a written instrument … that the work [should] be considered a work made for hire,” Gray Loon owned the website copyright as its author. POA could only acquire that ownership if Gray Loon transferred it through a signed writing.

Although Gray Loon’s phase-one proposal contained its philosophy that the clients’ purchase of goods and services inherently entailed ownership of those goods and services, the court held that the proposal lacked the “weight and certainty required by the Copyright Act.” Additionally, it failed to meet the signature requirement. Therefore, the transfer was ineffective and POA never acquired ownership of the website. The intention to transfer ownership effectively created a non-exclusive license in the first phase of the website, but nothing more. Because a non-exclusive license does not convey actual ownership, it cannot support a claim for conversion.

Though Justice Boehm agreed with “the majority’s analysis and conclusions,” he wrote separately to stress that the decision implies that “website design is personal property and is subject to a conversion claim.” He also stressed that POA “did not forfeit its [non-exclusive] license to the original website code and content” when it neglected to pay the hosting fees. Therefore, POA would have had a valid defense to the unpaid fees had it asserted a breach of license claim in court.

This case emphasizes the need for website-designer clients to 1) contract through an express, written agreement that the website is a work made for hire; 2) sign a written contract clearly transferring copyright ownership to the client; and 3) assert breach of a non-exclusive license in cases where the validity of the copyright ownership transfer is contested.

Lawsuit Against Brooks Brothers for Falsely Marketing Ties Dismissed

The 271 Patent Blog reports that on May 14, a district court granted Brooks Brothers’ motion to dismiss an action for false marketing. Pro se plaintiff Raymond Stauffer sued Brooks Brothers under section 292 of the Patent Act, which allows damages of “not more than $500″ for each false claim that unpatented items are protected by patent. Under the Act, damages are split between the plaintiff and the government. In Brooks Brothers’ case, the unpatented items were bow ties whose patents expired in 1956.  The district court granted the motion to dismiss based on a lack of “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” injury to the public from Brooks Brothers’ marketing claims.

Red Hat-Led Group Appeals Swiss Government’s Award of No-Bid Microsoft Contract

On May 21, Red Hat announced that a group of 18 technology companies filed an appeal with the Swiss Federal Administration Court. The appeal protests the Swiss government’s award of a three-year contract to Microsoft without a bidding process. eWeek explains that the Swiss Federal Bureau for Building and Logistics may award contracts without a bidding process when there is no adequate alternative available. The Red Hat-led group protested the assertion that no alternatives existed, pointing to many competing open source companies, some already used by the Swiss government. PCWorld discusses the rising strength of alternatives to Microsoft software.

Massachusetts Court Holds that TOS Violations Don’t Establish Probable Cause

The Electronic Frontier Foundation reports that on May 21, the Massachusetts Supreme Court granted defendant Riccardo Calixte’s motion to quash a search warrant that allowed police to seize the Boston College student’s computers and other devices. The court found no probable cause for the warrant, noting that violating a website’s terms of service (”TOS”) is not “obtaining computer services by fraud.” LinuxJournal provides a triumphant, but one-sided account of the decision. The issue of TOS violations recently received widespread media coverage in the Lori Drew “cyber-bullying” case, where a jury found that TOS violations can support criminal charges under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Founders of The Pirate Bay Internet Piracy Site Convicted, Sentenced to Prison

The New York Times reports that on April 17, a Swedish court convicted four men, including the three founders of The Pirate Bay website, on charges of promoting copyright infringement. The men were sentenced to one year in prison and ordered to pay the equivalent of $3.6 million in damages to the holders of the infringed copyrights. The Pirate Bay continues to provide links that allow users to download thousands of copyrighted songs, movies, and computer programs. John Kennedy, chief executive of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, said that the copyright holders will continue their efforts to shut down the website.

Electronic Frontier Foundation Supports Block on Gambling Domain-Name Seizure

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, in conjunction with the Center for Democracy and Technology and the American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, filed an amicus brief to the Kentucky Supreme Court on April 17. The brief supports the blocking of a Kentucky state court order, which requires domain name registrars outside of Kentucky to release control of over 100 domain names associated with gambling websites. A Kentucky court of appeals had previously blocked the trial court’s seizure order, ruling that Kentucky’s ban on “gambling devices” did not extend to internet domain names.

South Korean Blogger Acquitted on Charges of Spreading False Information

On April 20, a South Korean court acquitted Park Dae-sung on charges of purposely harming market sentiment. Reuters reports that Park had been accused of causing instability in the South Korean currency by spreading false information on his blog. Park had previously gained notoriety for posting accurate predictions of future economic troubles, including the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The court reasoned that even if Park did spread false information over the internet, he could not be convicted because he lacked the necessary intent to harm the public interest.