District Court Says CAN-SPAM Act Does Not Violate First Amendment
By Samantha Kuhn – Edited by Chinh Vo
U.S. v. Smallwood, 09-CR-00249 (N.D. Tex. July 15, 2011)
Slip Opinion hosted by Scribd.co
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas rejected a First Amendment challenge to the CAN-SPAM criminal statute, which prohibits the computer transmission of “multiple commercial electronic mail messages, with the intent to deceive or mislead recipients . . . . as to the origin of such messages.”
The court first rejected defendant Alicia Smallwood’s motions challenging her indictment for, among other things, electronic mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1037(a)(2) and (b)(2)(c) (“CAN-SPAM Act”). The court determined that Smallwood was engaging in “clearly proscribed conduct” and was therefore not entitled to challenge the statute for vagueness. As a result of this finding, the main issue in the case became whether the statute was overly broad in its regulation of protected speech and thus a violation of the First Amendment. The arguments presented by Smallwood for over-breadth centered around the statute’s limitations on commercial speech, and the court rejected them.
Eric Goldman provides commentary on the outcome and implications of the opinion. For a background on the CAN-SPAM Act’s requirements, see Cybertelecom.